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sound reasons why strict limits to maritime security cooperation pertain in many circumstances. Some of
those reasons may be due to temporary contexts, such as short-term political factors. Others may relate
to problems inherent in the particular issue in question, and yet others may be deeply structural and,
indeed, intractable. My argument therefore is structured in the following way. First, it addresses the
intractable, underlying problems that make progress in maritime security cooperation so difficult. Second,
it briefly addresses certain transnational maritime security issues, explaining why cooperation to deal
with some threats is much easier than for others.
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This paper takes a somewhat negative approach to the
goal of building collaboration to address transnational
maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific. It does
not make the case that seeking improvements in
cooperation is unreasonable, unworkable or simply not
worthwhile1 – only that there exist sound reasons why
strict limits to maritime security cooperation pertain in
many circumstances. Some of those reasons may be
due to temporary contexts, such as short-term political
factors. Others may relate to problems inherent in the
particular issue in question, and yet others may be deeply
structural and, indeed, intractable. My argument therefore
is structured in the following way. First, it addresses the
intractable, underlying problems that make progress in
maritime security cooperation so difficult. Second, it briefly
addresses certain transnational maritime security issues,
explaining why cooperation to deal with some threats is
much easier than for others.
Structural limits
The following sections deal in detail with what I term
structural constraints to better maritime security
collaboration in the Indo-Pacific area. These structural
limitations involve three interrelated factors: geography,
coastal state concerns with control over waters under
their jurisdiction, and political and strategic contexts. The
problems are ‘structural’ in that they either are inherent
and insurmountable, or of an intractable nature, making
resolution unlikely, if not necessarily inconceivable. Indeed,
these types of framing difficulties for the regional maritime
security environment have been described in terms of the
‘wicked problem’ descriptor.2
Geography
Physical geography can create potential political
headaches in different parts of the Indo-Pacific,
particularly once political and legal frameworks are laid
atop physical features. However, physical characteristics
can of themselves create difficulties. This is generally the
case with East Asia, but particularly so with respect to
archipelagic Southeast Asia. In East Asia, the island chains
that lie adjacent to the Asian mainland and semi-enclose
the string of connected seas from the Sea of Okhotsk in
the northeast, through to the Andaman Sea on the south37
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western, Indian Ocean, side of peninsular Southeast Asia,
create inherent complications for assuring maritime safety
and security. The fact that these semi-enclosed seas are
shared by numerous adjacent or nearby states, are used
by many others, and involve valuable marine resources,
actual or assumed, greatly complicates the practice of
maritime security. A similar problem afflicts the Persian
Gulf, for example, where several states must share one
enclosed sea space with a single narrow entry/exit point:
the straits of Hormuz.
The geographical context of archipelagic Southeast
Asia, consisting as it does of many thousands of islands,
necessarily makes attempts at securing good order at
sea a daunting task for authorities at the best of times.
The sheer extent of the eastern archipelago and the large
number of its islands makes it the most complex maritime
geography on the planet, and thus extremely difficult to
surveil and police. For the same reasons, the area is a
natural haven for criminals, terrorists, and other sea users
who behave contrary to the interests of good order at sea.
It would be incorrect to state that the area is ungoverned,
and certainly it would be unsound to suggest that the
waters of the eastern archipelago are ungovernable; yet it
must be recognized that good order is devilishly difficult to
impose within this overarching constraint of such complex
maritime geography.
Once political factors are added to physical geography,
the prospects for maritime security collaboration often are
made considerably worse. The competitive, sometimes
acquisitive, nature of state behaviour, which invariably
stresses the pursuit of the ‘national interest,’ conditions
the international politics of the seas and oceans just as
it does for terrestrial matters, and increasingly also for
the environments of international airspace, outer space
and cyberspace. One of the most politically daunting
challenges to manage if states are to better cooperate at
sea is that of disputed claims to maritime territory, from
significant islands to tiny, often physically trivial, rocks and
atolls, many of which may remain under water at high tide.
The Indo-Pacific is replete with maritime territorial disputes,
from the Persian Gulf to the mid-Indian Ocean Chagos
archipelago, to the Southwest Pacific.
However, in respect to maritime territorial disputes it is East
Asia which again dominates matters in the Indo-Pacific.

The author, in fact, has long been involved with organizing and
delivering regional maritime security cooperation and capacity-building
programmes for different agencies of the Australian government, and
understands both the potential and actual value of such collaborative
activities.
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See Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime
Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?” Contemporary
Southeast Asia Vol. 33, No. 1 (2011), pp. 1-28.
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The overlay of politics upon physical geography has
created many of the world’s most intractable island
disputes, the foremost of which is the mainland Chinese
claim to the self-governing island of Taiwan. Taiwan
is unique among island disputes in that it involves a
heavily populated, successful and prosperous de facto
independent state. Most other territorial disputes in
maritime East Asia instead involve either very small islands
or rocky features that remain unoccupied, or similar
features that are minimally garrisoned by the security
forces of one of the claimant states. The most noteworthy
of these disputes include the southern Kuriles/Northern
Territories (Russia-Japan); Tokdo/Takeshima (South KoreaJapan); the Senkakus/Diaoyutai (Japan-Taiwan-China);
the Pratas Islands (Taiwan-China); the Paracels (ChinaVietnam-Taiwan); Scarborough Shoal (China-PhilippinesTaiwan); and the Spratly archipelago (China-VietnamTaiwan-Philippines-Malaysia-Brunei). In each case the
dominant or controlling claimant has been listed first. The
identification of a dominant claimant (i.e. the claimant with
physical control of relevant features) has been rather more
contestable in the case of the infamous Spratly disputes
in the South China Sea, but Beijing’s assertions, expansion,
including island construction, and militarisation throughout
the archipelago in recent years make it clearer than ever
that China seeks a form of regional control. Indeed,
China’s actions throughout East Asian seas have made it
both more important and, at the same time, often more
difficult, to engage Beijing in many aspects of maritime
security collaboration.
Regional geography in East Asia also greatly complicates
coastal state jurisdiction over adjacent sea areas. These
are rights under international law generated by sovereignty
over land features. This involves overlaying the legal
framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention or UNCLOS) upon
the political and physical aspects of the region’s maritime
geography. Even leaving aside the further complicating
impact of territorial disputes upon maritime jurisdiction, the
basic political geography of East Asia has dealt regional
states a difficult hand to play in claiming jurisdiction. The
‘narrow seas’ character of the region’s semi-enclosed seas
means that its coastal states will more often than not have
to compromise with their neighbours in order to determine
jurisdiction over adjacent waters. For example, at no point
does the East China Sea exceed 400 nautical miles in
breadth. Yet, as China and Japan both claim the maximum
allowable exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical
miles as measured from their territorial sea baselines, their
claims unavoidably overlap. Such jurisdictional disputes are
rendered even more delicate when territorial disputes are
factored into maritime jurisdictional claims. In this way, East
China Sea claims are impacted by the effect that Taiwan,
with its highly emotive disputed status, and the disputed
Senkaku Islands, also impose upon jurisdictional claims.
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Similarly complicated, if perhaps not so inherently
dangerous, maritime jurisdictional disputes exist elsewhere
in East Asia, placing further constraints upon prospects for
improved maritime security collaboration. The potential for
already fraught maritime jurisdictional claims in the South
China Sea to be negatively affected by more-expansive
claims derived from disputed territories is a spectre that
haunts the prospects for successful maritime delimitation
in the area. Currently, the extent of maritime jurisdictional
claims generated by occupied or claimed territorial features
under dispute remains uncertain and contested, both with
respect to interpretations of international law and individual
claimant state positions. Collaboration at sea is made
inherently difficult if jurisdiction is disputed or uncertain, or if
boundaries remain undelimited.
Coastal state control
In addition to the problem of disputed sovereignty over
maritime territory, many coastal states in the Indo-Pacific
region continue to assert rights over adjacent waters that
can be deemed to significantly exceed the potential rights
to jurisdiction granted by the Law of the Sea Convention.3
This phenomenon has commonly been termed one of
‘creeping’ coastal state jurisdiction, and is particularly
common among geopolitically dissatisfied states such
as China, and many developing states. The problem of
excessive claims to maritime jurisdiction is a global one, but
the complex maritime geography of East Asia, in particular,
as outlined above, makes the problem more acute in East
Asian waters. The problem to some extent reflects the
preoccupation of some developing states with a postcolonial maximalist view of sovereignty assertion. Such
assertions at sea may reflect a lack of confidence in their
capacity to actually protect existing maritime rights. This
may be a particular concern for archipelagic states such
as Indonesia and the Philippines, and fellow straits state
Malaysia. Concerns, probably unfounded, over sovereignty
erosion, is a leading reason why neither Indonesia nor
Malaysia have become parties to the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Nevertheless, such
states can understandably feel particularly vulnerable to
a range of threats due to the high volume of maritime
traffic plying waters under their sovereignty and employing
passage rights such as transit passage in straits used for
international navigation,4 archipelagic sea lanes passage
in archipelagic waters,5 or innocent passage in the
territorial sea.6
For the standard, albeit American, view on the extent of this problem,
see J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims,
3rd ed. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).

3

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (hereafter
“UNCLOS”), arts. 37-44.
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Ibid., arts. 53-54.

6

Ibid., arts. 17-26.

They also may simply be attempting to push for rights long
hoped for but unmet during UNCLOS negotiations. There
may be a view among some states that, if they continue to
assert such coveted rights and are unchallenged by other
states, over time such rights may become accepted state
practice and part of customary international law. Yet other
states may simply be chancing their luck to see what they
can get away with.
It is possible that, over time, some states may be less
inclined to make such assertions as their maritime
capabilities grow, although the opposite trend has
been apparent in China’s case. Further, the attitudes
of some states with respect to sovereignty assertion is
particularly heavily ingrained. Indonesia is a clear case
in point. It is not at all certain whether any amount of
local capacity improvement or confidence-building could
change attitudes that are intimately linked to Indonesia’s
archipelagic conception of national unity.7

parts of the Convention, a consequence of the difficult
negotiation process, this issue can also be exaggerated.
The problem of differing ‘interpretations’ in the context of
military operations in the EEZ is simply a euphemism for
a more fundamental difficulty. The problem, rather, is one
that is better characterised as that of certain states wilfully
choosing to misinterpret the Convention simply because
they don’t like the implications of specific provisions.
State parties to the Law of the Sea Convention, however,
are unable to pick and choose which pieces of the
Convention they wish to adhere to: it is a single, complete
document, with interrelated provisions that can only be
treated in their entirety.

In fact, the UNCLOS provisions are relatively clear. There
are no conceivable grounds by which a coastal state can
interfere with the military operations of other states in its
exclusive economic zone unless such activities undermine
the very specific rights of UNCLOS Part V on the EEZ: that
is, rights directly related to exploration and exploitation
It seems clear that China also seems to be pursuing
of marine resources, other economic uses of the zone,
a maximalist agenda at sea with its territorial and
establishment or use of artificial islands and installations,
jurisdictional claims, and its ambition to be able to exert
marine scientific research, or protection and preservation
control over adjacent seas within, at a minimum, the soof the marine environment.11 Otherwise, all the high seas
called first island chain.8 In China’s case, while Beijing
freedoms of “navigation and overflight and the laying of
may well believe in the righteousness of its claims, its
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally
rather more ambitious quest for regional control reflects its
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such
broader strategic and geopolitical goals for East Asia.
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft
The law of the sea, as with international law in general, is a and submarine cables and pipelines …” apply also in the
slowly evolving beast. Since the Law of the Sea Convention exclusive economic zone.12 Other high seas provisions
was agreed in 1982, numerous post-UNCLOS international (articles 88-115) also apply in the EEZ.13 Much is often
legal instruments have been negotiated, such as the UN
made of the provision that, in exercising their EEZ rights,
Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995, and the development
states “shall have due regard to the rights of the coastal
of new environmental, safety and security regulations for
State.”14 But those making that point commonly avoid
shipping under the auspices of the International Maritime
noting that this duty is reciprocal: the UNCLOS also
Organization. Many of these instruments further develop or provides that “… the coastal State shall have due regard to
modify aspects of the Law of the Sea Convention, including the rights and duties of other States …” in the EEZ.15
slowly regulating certain activities on the high seas.9 The
basic principles of maritime jurisdiction based on specific
7
See Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia’s Maritime
Territorial Policy (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
UNCLOS zones, however, remain essentially unchanged.
1996).
The Law of the Sea Convention took literally decades to
8
On the island chain concept see Andrew S. Erickson and Joel
negotiate, involving three international conferences and
Wuthnow,
“Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China
inevitable compromises between Third World coastal
Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” The China Quarterly Vol.
states, which desired ever-greater rights, and maritime
225 (March 2016), pp. 1-22.
powers and user states, which preferred to maintain many
9
See, for example, Robin Warner, “The High Seas Regime: A Model
traditional freedoms. The resulting compromise established of Self-regulation?” and “Developing New Regulatory Paradigms for
a delicate balance. That balance, and thus the Convention the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas
beyond National Jurisdiction,” both in Routledge Handbook of Maritime
itself, is potentially placed at risk by the raft of excessive
Regulation and Enforcement, ed. Robin Warner and Stuart Kaye
claims now being exerted in Asia.
(London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 16-26 and 394-408, respectively.
The disputes that increasingly occur between coastal
states claiming greater control over adjacent waters, and
maritime powers seeking to sustain hard-won freedoms,
are often referred to as a problem of ‘interpretation’ of
the Law of the Sea Convention generated by its alleged
ambiguity. The most contentious aspect in the Indo-Pacific
relates to military operations in the exclusive economic
zone.10 While there is intentional ambiguity in many
39
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For extensive analysis and various viewpoints, see the two special
editions of the journal Marine Policy, Vol. 28 (January 2004) and Vol. 29
(March 2005).

10

11

UNCLOS art. 56(1).

12

Ibid., art. 58(1).

13

Ibid., art. 58(2).

14

Ibid., art. 58(3).

15

Ibid., art. 56(2).

In both cases, those rights and duties relate directly and
explicitly to the very narrow, mostly economic, purpose of
the EEZ regime; that is, those limited types of activities for
which the regime was designed, noted above.
Therefore, unless such coastal state economic or
environmental rights are being hindered by a military
operation, there are no grounds for the coastal state to
interfere with the operation. Chinese efforts to prevent or
interfere with American military operations in East Asian
waters have been the most egregious examples of this
type of interference in the Indo-Pacific region,16 but not the
only ones. Indeed, there are many Indo-Pacific states that
assert restrictions on the navigational freedoms of warships
and other naval vessels, and not just in the exclusive
economic zone.17 China has also been increasingly
aggressive in its assertions in the airspace above its
claimed EEZs. Beijing is on even weaker ground in the air
than it is on the water, as has been made abundantly clear:
“The airspace above the EEZ is not part of the EEZ and
aircraft of all states have freedom of overflight and therefore
the right to undertake military operations.”18
Incidents that occur in and around disputed features,
such as those in the South China Sea, may be particularly
problematic, in that the sovereignty status of the features
and the consequent status of adjacent waters are
unresolved. Leaving aside debates on whether or not any
of the disputed features are actually eligible under the
UNCLOS to generate maritime zones of any consequence,
Beijing’s maximalist agenda to be able to control, at a
minimum, the entire disputed area encompassed within its
infamous nine-dash line claim,19 if not potentially the entire
sea space within the first island chain, creates an obvious
challenge not just to the Law of the Sea, but extant
international law and good order, generally. Cooperation
even to combat common concerns with transnational
maritime security threats under these circumstances
obviously becomes far more problematic. This point
leads directly into the next section, dealing with the
underlying strategic factors that may limit the prospects for
better collaboration.
Political and strategic contexts
The negative impacts of China’s quest for control affect not
just its rival claimant states, but all states with interests in
the region or that depend upon good order at sea, directly
or indirectly, for their continued security, prosperity and
wellbeing. The fact that most states are trade-dependent,
and thus need to interact with the large and growing
economies of East Asia, means that most states have an
interest in the maritime security situation in East Asia and
throughout the Indo-Pacific, no matter where on the globe
they are situated. Improving maritime security cooperation
to protect that common interest under this weight of
geopolitical threat to the current regional order, though, has
become far more difficult.
40
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This problem becomes even more apparent when one
considers that the principal instruments for securing order
at sea, navies, and, to a lesser extent, coast guards, are
the very forces that China is seeking to either exclude from
the East Asian littoral region, or at least greatly limit their
activities. This is particularly the case with respect to those
maritime security forces that are part of the U.S. alliance
system, or belong to other likeminded states that take
the task of good order at sea seriously. China’s actions
to restrict U.S. and other foreign military presence in East
Asian seas are not limited to peacetime challenges to
freedoms of navigation and overflight. In fact, the forces
of China’s People’s Liberation Army have been developed
over the past two decades specifically for the purpose
of deterring and defending against American and allied
interventions throughout the East Asian littoral in response
to situations in which China seeks to enforce control by
military aggression or other coercive means. The popular
Pentagon phraseology of the moment to describe China’s
strategy is that of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD).
It is worth noting also that important institutions such as
the Law of the Sea Convention do not apply to certain
waters only, but are global in scope. Any concerted
attempt to undermine such international rules and norms
in East Asia does not just have regional consequences: the
impact would be to damage the global liberal order.

While imperfect, any breakdown of the
UNCLOS or other institutions of global
order could be catastrophic, resulting in
a truly chaotic and conflict-ridden
maritime environment.
A strong nerve thus is required by all states heavily
invested in maintaining a liberal international order to deter
or prevent states such as China from further undermining
that system, including at sea. It is for just such a purpose
that states such as Australia and Japan have been
deepening their strategic relationship in concert with their
common ally, the United States.
16
See, for example, Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “The Bull in the China Shop:
Raising Tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region” and “Military Activities in the
Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus,” both in International Law
Studies, Vol. 90 (2014), pp. 66-100 and 514-543, respectively.

See Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region,
Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 22 (Canberra: Sea Power
Centre – Australia, 2008).
17

18
Martin Tsamenyi and Barry Snushall, “The Legal Dimension of
Maritime Military Operations,” in Positioning Navies for the Future, ed.
Jack McCaffrie (Sydney: Halstead Press, 2006), p. 116.

For the Chinese position see China’s responses to other states’
submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf:
People’s Republic of China, Letter to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Doc. CML/17/2009, 7 May 2009; and Letter to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Doc. CML/18/2009, 7 May 2009. See
also Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-dash Line in the South
China Sea: History, Status, and Implications,” The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 107, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 98-124.
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China is not the sole challenger to international order, but
in the Indo-Pacific it lies at the centre of great power
strategic competition at sea, whether its competitor is
Japan, the United States or India. Nonetheless, the IndoPacific is replete with other maritime conflicts and disputes,
and is home to many cases of enmity or historical mistrust
not involving Beijing. None of these political-strategic
factors necessarily preclude states from engaging in
cooperation for maritime security, but they can seriously
hamper those efforts.
Transnational maritime security challenges
Cooperation to deal with transnational maritime security
challenges is clearly far easier to achieve in some cases
than others. This may be due to the type of threat, the
particular states involved, or the location of the problem.
Cooperation on certain issues is relatively simple to deal
with. For example, international cooperation in the search
for the missing Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 in the
southern Indian Ocean has been relatively easy, at least
politically, if not necessarily operationally. Even if the cause
of the crash is disputed, the international imperative to find
the wreckage is not controversial, and no state’s maritime
jurisdiction seems to be included in the search area. Even
in the case of the crash of Indonesia AirAsia flight QZ8501/
AWQ8501 into the Java Sea in December 2014, multiple
countries rendered assistance to Indonesia in the search
and recovery operations. Thus, even in the archipelagic
waters of a state highly conscious of its interests in
protecting its sovereign integrity, it was not controversial
to invite or allow foreign navies to assist Indonesian
authorities. Search and rescue, and recovery operations
are probably the least-sensitive issues to deal with when it
comes to international collaboration.
To take another example, however – that of piracy and
armed robbery at sea – demonstrates both possibilities
and limitations for collaboration. It is important to
remember that, while the two activities may be functionally
equivalent, legally they are quite distinct. Piracy is an
international crime with universal jurisdiction that occurs on
the high seas.20 As a result of UNCLOS article 58(2), which
applies certain high seas provisions to the EEZ, the law of
piracy also applies within the exclusive economic zone. As
we have witnessed in the extensive multinational efforts to
suppress Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean, collaboration
is not only possible, but has been successful, albeit at
great financial cost to sustain the naval effort.
However, armed robbery at sea, which is a common but
non-legal term to describe piratical acts that occur in
waters under the sovereignty of the coastal state, where
the international law of piracy doesn’t apply, is altogether a
more problematic issue for maritime security collaboration.
In Southeast Asia, most, albeit not all, piratical incidents
occur within zones of coastal state sovereignty: internal
waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.21
41
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This means that the coastal state itself is responsible for
enforcement actions to protect vessels in those zones
from piratical attack, presuming it has the capacity and/
or the appropriate legislative framework in place to deal
with the threat. Given that most of these incidents occur in
the waters of states that jealously guard their sovereignty,
there are obvious limits to cooperation. Indeed, few
states anywhere are likely to be willing to invite foreign
enforcement vessels into waters under their sovereignty to
assist in such maritime security operations.
The cause of collaboration is not altogether lost, however:
there are many ways in which states can assist afflicted
coastal states, including by sharing information,22 or by
building coastal state capacity, from training personnel to
supplying vessels or other equipment and infrastructure.
The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore
is a leading regional example of international cooperation to
improve the sharing of maritime security information.
An even more difficult transnational problem is that of
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This
difficulty in part stems from the fact that fish are inherently
transnational: they don’t respect international boundaries
even if such borders have been agreed. Obviously, in
areas where waters are in dispute or boundaries have
yet to be delimited, enforcement actions are inherently
compromised, and fish stocks suffer in the absence of
sound governance. The problem also relates to the sad
fact that demand far outweighs the available supply of
marine-capture fish, and fishing capacity and fishing
technology developments far outweigh the sustainability
of fish stocks. Further, IUU fishing is compounded by the
fact that the international legal framework to combat the
problem is highly constrained,23 meaning that coastal
states often are forced to deal with highly organised
transnational criminal groups or toughminded fishermen
from a starting point of relative legal disadvantage.

20

UNCLOS arts. 101 and 105.

For details, including locations, on piratical incidents throughout
Asia, see the regular reports prepared by the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre, available at http://www.
recaap.org/.
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I have discussed the information sharing issue extensively in Chris
Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for
the Royal Australian Navy, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 24
(Canberra: Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2008), pp. 35-49.
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The standard text on IUU fishing is Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi
and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International
Legal Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); and see also Mary Ann PalmaRobles, “Fisheries Enforcement and the Concepts of Compliance
and Monitoring, Control and Surveillance,” in Routledge Handbook of
Maritime Regulation and Enforcement, pp. 139-160.
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Operationally, combating IUU fishing can also be extremely
difficult, especially across vast areas of ocean, such
as in the Southwest Pacific, where small island states
depend on assistance for aerial surveillance. Surveillance
assistance is only one part of Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat
Program to help the Pacific island states with fisheries
enforcement, a leading example of regional maritime
security collaboration.
In narrow sea areas, however, the problems are often
more of a political nature, and not just with respect to
unresolved jurisdiction. It is the case in Southeast Asia,
for instance, that many of the worst perpetrators of IUU
fishing may be one’s near neighbours.24 This creates
political, legal and operational headaches for states trying
to enforce their waters and protect the sustainability of
fish stocks. The problem is worsened when waters are
disputed. For example, Indonesia’s claimed South China
Sea EEZ overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. There have
been at least four separate incidents in this area, in which
Indonesian fisheries patrol boats have arrested Chinese
fishing boats, only to be forced by much larger Chinese
civilian enforcement vessels to release the alleged Chinese
IUU boats. The most recent of these incidents occurred in
the same area on 19 March 2016.25
The future of regional collaboration
This conclusion does not set out to establish all the
possible avenues for future maritime security collaboration
in the Indo-Pacific region. Anyone who has been involved
with the field for a number of years will understand that
maritime security cooperation, despite its limits, has grown
substantially over the past 20 years. Many significant
achievements have been hard won, such as Japan’s
important ReCAAP initiative, the only official regional
organisation for dealing with maritime security issues.
Even if its remit is limited to information-sharing only
about certain classes of threats, the establishment of the
Information Sharing Centre has been a major step forward
for cooperation to combat piracy and armed robbery at
sea. That it includes China, which, as pointed out above,
is a leading source of instability at sea, and an opponent of
Japanese maritime security initiatives, is a telling indication
that there are some issues of common interest that may
transcend even underlying strategic tensions. Japan,
Australia, the United States, Singapore and India are all
leading efforts to boost collaboration for maritime security
in the Indo-Pacific. Further and deeper cooperation will no
doubt evolve, as it must.
However, future cooperation can only occur within strict
constraints, some of which have been outlined in this
essay. Many of those structural limitations will mean that
cooperation can only occur in certain circumstances or
over certain issues.
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The route to better-governed seas, especially
in East Asia, but more broadly throughout the
Indo-Pacific, will be a choppy one.
And, if China, in particular, continues on its path of
challenging the regional order, collaboration to combat
transnational security problems at sea will become even
more difficult. Stronger defence alliances and coalitions to
protect the existing liberal order will likely be a necessary
step, then, in order to address transnational maritime
security issues.
Alliance-strengthening efforts such as those being pursued
by the United States with Japan, Australia and the
Philippines, and U.S. coalition-building activities, such as
the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), are at
the very least implicitly aimed at countering the instability
at sea being generated by Chinese activities. In the case
of the Maritime Security Initiative, first announced by U.S.
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the May 2015
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Washington will
commit US$425 million over five years to maritime security
capacity-building for South China Sea littoral states,
focused on surveillance and maritime situational awareness
capabilities. The initial funding priority for the United States
is the Philippines, but Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and
Vietnam also are expected to benefit from MSI projects.26
Similarly, Indian maritime security capacity-building in
Indian Ocean island states has the dual role of improving
national and regional maritime security and countering
Chinese political influence.
Efforts of these sorts to counter Chinese influence, while at
the same time building regional and sub-regional maritime
security capacity, are not contradictory in purpose, but they
do complicate attempts at wider, inclusive, non-coalition
maritime cooperation to combat transnational threats at
sea.27 Encouraging Chinese participation, and that of other
sceptical or cautious states, can be all the more difficult
due to the underlying strategic contexts for coalitionbuilding behaviour. Nonetheless, the ReCAAP example is
proof that inclusiveness under particular circumstances, at
least involving China, is still possible.
See, for example, the interview with Indonesia’s forthright Minister
of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, “RI, Others Stand Up
to Bullying by Big Countries: Minister Susi,” The Jakarta Post (15 April
2016), p. 3.
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Tama Salim, “RI-China Sea Spat Continues,” The Jakarta Post (22
March 2016), p. 1.

25

Megan Eckstein, “The Philippines at Forefront of New Pentagon
Maritime Security Initiative,” U.S. Naval Institute news (18 April 2016),
available at https://news.usni.org/2016/04/18/the-philippines-atforefront-of-new-pentagon-maritime-security-initiative.
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I have developed a framework for naval and maritime cooperation
based on alliance, coalition and non-coalition levels of cooperation in
Chris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast
Asia and the Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospect, Sea Power
Centre and Centre for Maritime Policy Working Paper No. 7 (Canberra:
Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, October 2001).
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These points lead to a conclusion that Indo-Pacific
maritime security cooperation needs to continue to be
pursued on multiple paths. The proliferation of forums
and various institutional arrangements for collaboration
may sometimes be thought of as introducing unnecessary
redundancy and repetition into the regional maritime
security cooperation equation. Yet it is possible that a
multiplicity of options for cooperation can be beneficial
in circumstances in which certain states may be wary of
some avenues for collaboration but not others. It may well
be the case that Track II unofficial fora have little to offer
now that so much official-level activity takes place. But
redundancy of effort at the official level, across alliance,
coalition and non-coalition levels of cooperation, and
between military and civilian sectors, offers the best
opportunities over the long run to both strengthen regional
deterrence against adventurism at sea, and deepen
networks of more politically neutral collaboration to deal
with transnational maritime security problems.
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